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1. Introduction
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) call labor market regulation all political or
administrative measures that support, and labor market deregulation those
than weaken the bargaining power of labor unions. This article explores the
effects of the integration of capital and labor markets in countries where labor
market are regulated and there is an unemployment insurance scheme.
A common tool in modeling international trade is Neary’s (2016) gen-
eral oligopolistic equilibrium model (GOLE), where the utility functions are
quadratic and the economy contains a large number (“continuum”) of sectors,
each containing a small number of firms. Because all income-consumption
curves are linear in GOLE, they allow for consistent aggregation over indi-
viduals with different incomes. This is in particular proper for our purposes,
because it enables the derivation of utility functions for workers, capital own-
ers, national governments and the international policy maker.
Boulhol (2009) incorporates labor market regulation into a model of in-
ternationally transferable capital. He shows that because capital mobility
re-allocates resources away from the highly-unionized sector, and because
the threat of costly relocations encourages labor market deregulation, glob-
alization ultimately reduces labor market rigidities. Aloi et al. (2009) study
capital transfer liberalization in a two-country model where the labor markets
are non-unionized in one, but unionized in the other country. They show that
capital flows from the country with unionized into that with non-unionized
labor markets. Consequently, labor income decrease and profits increase in
the former, but vice versa in the latter country. Both Boulhol (2009) and
Aloi et al. (2009) assume efficient bargaining: the firm owner and the labor
union bargain over the wage and employment simultaneously. Consequently,
the wage is equal to the reference wage and the rent is divided between the
parties according to their relative bargaining power. If efficient bargaining
were introduced into GOLE, then relative union bargaining power would af-
fect income distribution only, having no effect on the allocation of resources.
That is why this article assumes right-to-manage bargaining: the firm owner
and the labor union bargain over the wage subject to the firm’s demand for
labor. In that case, relative union bargaining power affects both the wage
and the level of employment, and consequently the allocation of resources.
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Martin and Rogers (1995) and Baldwin et al. (2003) introduce capital
as a second factor of production into GOLE as a fixed input, while labor
serves as a variable input to production. Egger and Etzel (2014) apply that
extended GOLE for two countries, of which one hosts firm-level and the other
sector-level labor unions. In contrast, I apply the extended GOLE model for
two identical trading countries, where the local governments play Nash by
regulating relative union bargaining power.
Palokangas (2015) applies GOLE for the integration of two identical coun-
tries performing labor market regulation. He, however, assumes that there
is only one input called labor, and that the goods markets are only par-
tially integrated: there are competitive, open (but segmented) and shielded
sectors. He shows that lower trade costs and international labor market reg-
ulation promote aggregate welfare, decreasing open-sector relative wages. In
contrast in this article, I apply GOLE for the same purpose, but with the
assumptions that the goods markets are fully integrated and there are two
inputs : labor and potentially transferable capital.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the structure of the countries and characterizes general equilibrium as an
extensive form game where the households, firms, governments and labor
and employer lobbies act as players. Section 3 considers the behavior of the
households. Sections 4 establishes the equilibrium of the product markets.
Section 5 derives the utilities for the groups of households, by which sections
6 and 7 construct the behavior of the investors, the national governments
and the international regulator. Section 8 summarizes the results.
2. The economy
To keep the analysis tractable, I consider two identical countries, domes-
tic and foreign. Both countries have a “continuum” [0, 1] of workers, each
supplying one unit of labor, and a “continuum” of sectors z ∈ [0, 1]. Each
sector z ∈ [0, 1] produces one unit of a different traded good with label z.
The workers earn only wages and the capital owners only profits. A worker’s
labor time is unity. I construct a simple unemployment insurance scheme by
the assumptions that the unemployed workers derive utility from their extra
spare time and the employed support the unemployed workers.
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Following Martin and Rogers (1995), Baldwin et al. (2003) and Egger
and Etzel (2014), I assume that sectors z ∈ [0, 1] use capital as a fixed, but
labor as a variable input: each firm employs one worker to produce one unit
of output, but needs one unit of capital to start up and to operate itself.
Thus, there are endogenous numbers n(z) and n∗(z) of domestic and foreign
oligopolists in each sector z ∈ [0, 1], respectively.
Each country has a fixed number K of capital owners, each of which
supplies one unit of capital. If capital is immobile, then the supply of capital
is equal to the number of capital owners in each country:
K =
∫ 1
0
n(z)dz and K =
∫ 1
0
n∗(z)dz with immobile capital. (1)
If capital is mobile (e.g. footloose), then cross-border capital transfers involve
transaction costs: a marginal transfer of domestic into foreign capital (i.e.
a decrease of
∫ 1
0
n(z)dz) creates less and less foreign capital
∫ 1
0
n∗(z)dz, and
vice versa. This defines the decreasing and concave function
∫ 1
0
n∗(z)dz = f
(∫ 1
0
n(z)dz
)
, f ′ < 0, f ′′ < 0 and K = f(K)
with footloose capital, (2)
where K = f(K) results from the assumption that the countries are identical.
Profit income is repatriated to the owner’s original country of residence.
The government controls the wages either directly by setting minimum
wages, or indirectly by regulating the workers’ bargaining power. In the
latter case, the workers and employers are organized in the labor union and
the employer federation, respectively, to bargain over wages. This can be
modeled as an alternating-offers game where both parties maximize their
members’ utility (cf. Appendix D). The government run labor market policy
either nationally or delegate it to the international regulator.
The general equilibrium of the model is established as an extensive form
game where the households, firms and governments and the international
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regulator act as players. This game has the following stages:1
(i) The governments or the international regulator sets the wages.
(ii) Capital owners invest where they generate the highest return.
(iii) The workers insure themselves against unemployment.
(iv) The firms produce their output from labor and capital.
(v) The households consume the products of the firms.
This game is solved by backward induction: sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 consider
stages (v), (iv), (iii) and (ii), respectively, and section 7 stage (i). By this
game, I compare the wage and welfare effects of two forms of economic inte-
gration: the two countries (a) relax international capital movements, or (b)
delegate their labor market policy to a common international regulator.
3. Households
I extend Neary’s (2016) GOLE model as follows: household h derives util-
ity uh from consumption and spare time according to the quadratic function
uh
.
= εh
∫ 1
0
[
ach(z)− b
2
ch(z)
2
]
dz, εh =
{
1 + g if h unemployed,
1 otherwise,
(3)
where ch(z) is its consumption of oligopolistic good z ∈ [0, 1] and a > 0,
b > 0 and g > 0 are constants. Thus, with the same income, an unemployed
worker has a higher level of welfare than an employed worker.
Household h’s budget constraint is
Ih =
∫ 1
0
p(z)ch(z)dz, (4)
where where p(z) is the price for oligopolistic good z ∈ [0, 1] and Ih household
h’s income. Household h maximizes utility (3) by its consumption, ch(z) for
1If the government controls relative union bargaining power, then it sets relative union
bargaining power in stage (i), and the unions and employer federations are agents operating
between stages (ii) and (iii) in the extensive form game (cf. Appendix D).
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z ∈ [0, 1], subject to its budget constraint (4). This yields
λhp(z) = a− bch(z) for z ∈ [0, 1], (5)
where λh is the marginal utility of income for household h.
The representative household of the two countries earns income I, con-
sumes c(z), z ∈ [0, 1], and has the marginal utility of income, λ:
I
.
=
∫
h
Ihdh, c(z)
.
=
∫
h
ch(z)dh, λ
.
=
∫
h
λhdh. (6)
Following Neary (2016), I normalize the prices so that the representative
household’s marginal utility of income is equal to unity [cf. (6)]:
λ = 1. (7)
Summing (4) and (5) over h ∈ [0, 1] and noting (6) and (7) yield the aggregate
budget constraint, the inverse demand functions and the price index P :
I =
∫ 1
0
p(z)c(z)dz, p(z) = a− bc(z), P .=
∫ 1
0
p(z)dz = a− b
∫ 1
0
c(z)dz.
(8)
In Appendix A, I show that household h’s utility uh is a function of its
personal income Ih, aggregate income I and the price level P as follows:
uh = εhU(Ih, I, P ), λh = U1
.
=
∂U
∂Ih
> 0, U2
.
=
∂U
∂I
= −U
2
1
2
< 0,
U3
.
=
∂U
∂P
=
a
b
(
U1
2
− 1
)
U1 < 0. (9)
Higher personal income Ih promotes a household’s welfare. An increase in
the price level P hampers a household’s welfare uh. Higher aggregate income
I increases the variance of prices, which hampers a household’s welfare.
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4. Product markets
Let w(z) and w∗(z) be the domestic and foreign wages and l(z) and l∗(z)
domestic and foreign employment in sector z ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Because
one unit of oligopolistic good z ∈ [0, 1] is produced from one unit of labor,
the total demand for output, c(z), is equal to the total demand for labor,
l(z) + l∗(z), in sector z ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the aggregate demand for labor is
L
.
=
∫ 1
0
[l(z) + l∗(z)]dz =
∫ 1
0
c(z)dz. (10)
In each sector z ∈ [0, 1], an endogenous number n(z) of domestic firms
and an endogenous number n∗(z) of foreign firms produce a homogeneous
sector-specific output, taking each other’s outputs as given. Home firm j ∈
{1, ..., n(z)} in sector z ∈ [0, 1] produces its output lj(z) from lj(z) units of
labor and employs one unit of capital as a fixed input. The foreign firms
behave accordingly. Because sectors z ∈ [0, 1] are identical, the countries
are identical, and a worker produces one unit of output in any sector, then
the price p, domestic employment l, aggregate employment L and aggregate
income I are given by [cf. (8) and (10)]
w(z) = w, w∗(z) = w∗, l(z) = l, c(z) = l(z) + l∗(z) = L
and p(z) = P (L)
.
= a− bL with dP
dL
= −b for z ∈ [0, 1], (11)
I(L)
.
=
∫ 1
0
p(z)c(z)dz = P (L)L,
dI
dL
= P − bL = a− 2bL. (12)
Because the sectors z ∈ [0, 1] are identical, then, in equilibrium, the
constraints for capital transfers, (1) and (2), become
n = n∗ = K = constant with immobile capital,
n∗ = f(n), f ′ < 0, f ′′ < 0, and K = f(K) with footloose capital. (13)
Noting this, total employment L, domestic employment l, domestic profit pi
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and foreign profit pi∗ are functions of the domestic wage w, the foreign wage
w∗ and the number of domestic oligopolists, n (cf. Appendix B):
l(w,w∗, n),
∂l
∂w∗
> 0,
dl
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w
< 0,
∂l
∂n
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n
> 0; (14)
L(w,w∗, n),
∂L
∂w
=
∂L
∂w∗
< 0,
∂L
∂n
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n
= 0; (15)
pi(w,w∗, n),
∂pi
∂w
< 0,
dpi
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w
< 0; (16)
pi∗(w,w∗, n∗),
dpi∗
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w
< 0,
∂2(pi + pi∗)
∂w∂n
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n
< 0. (17)
Results (14), (15) and (16) can be interpreted as follows. The domestic wage
w decreases, but the foreign wage w∗ increases domestic employment l and
domestic profit pi, given the number n of domestic firms in a market. Both
of these wages decrease aggregate employment L. An increase in the number
of domestic oligopolists, n, increases domestic employment l and domestic
profits pi, but has no effect of aggregate employment L in the neighborhood
of the symmetric equilibrium with w∗ = w and n∗ = n. Because the countries
are identical, foreign profits (17) are symmetrical with domestic profits (16).
The transfer of capital from the foreign to the domestic country (i.e. an
increase in n) decreases aggregate profits pi + pi∗ the more
(
i.e. the smaller
∂(pi+pi∗)
∂w
)
, the higher the domestic wage w is [cf. (17)].
5. Utilities of groups
Because the quadratic preferences (3) allow for consistent aggregation
over individuals with different incomes, then, noting (9) and (10), the utilities
of groups can be constructed as follows. The representative domestic capital
owner earns domestic profits pi
.
=
∫ 1
0
pi(z)dz and derives utility
VΠ
.
= U(pi, I, P ). (18)
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The representative international capital owner in the two countries earns
domestic and foreign profits pi + pi∗ and derives utility [cf. (18)]
VC
.
= VΠ + V
∗
Π = U(pi + pi
∗, I, P ). (19)
The domestic unemployment insurance scheme distributes total domes-
tic wages wl between the employed and unemployed workers. Then, the
representative domestic worker ’s utility is (cf. Appendix C)
VW = U
(
h(l)w, I, P
)
with h′ > 0, (20)
where h(l)w is the representative domestic worker’s income equivalent.
The representative domestic household earns the domestic worker’s in-
come equivalent h(l)w plus the representative capital owner’s income (=
domestic profit pi) and derives utility [cf. (18) and (20)]
VN
.
= VΠ + VW = U
(
H(w,w∗, n), I, P
)
, H(w,w∗, n) .= pi + h(l)w,
∂H
∂w∗
=
∂pi
∂w∗︸︷︷︸
+
+ wh′︸︷︷︸
+
∂l
∂w∗︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂H
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗=n
= wh′︸︷︷︸
+
∂l
∂n
∣∣∣∣
n∗=n︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0. (21)
Aggregate welfare VA is the utility of the representative household that earns
domestic income H plus foreign income H∗ = pi∗ + h(l∗)w∗ [cf. (21)]:
VA = VN + V
∗
N = U(H +H
∗, I, P ). (22)
The representative household’s marginal utility of income is [cf. (7) and (22)]
U1(H +H
∗, I, P ) = U1(H, I, P ) + U1(H∗, I, P ) = λ = 1. (23)
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6. Capital transfers
With mobile capital, a single international capital owner maximizes its
welfare (19) by the number of domestic firms, n, subject to the transformation
curve (13), given aggregate income I and the price index P [cf. (16) and (17)]:
n˜(w,w∗) .= arg max
n s.t. (13)
VC = arg max
n
[
pi(w,w∗, n) + pi∗
(
w,w∗, f(n)
)]
.
(24)
Differentiating the first-order condition ∂(pi+pi
∗)
∂n
= 0 of the maximization,
and noting (13), (17) and the second-order condition ∂
2(pi+pi∗)
∂n2
< 0 of the
maximization, one obtains that an increase in the domestic wage w decreases
the number n˜ of domestic firms:
∂n˜
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
= − ∂
2(pi + pi∗)
∂w∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
/
∂2(pi + pi∗)
∂n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0, n˜(w,w) = K,
dn˜
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w
=
∂n˜
∂w
+
∂n˜
∂w∗
=
dK
dw
= 0. (25)
.
With immobile capital, the number of firms in each country is fixed [cf.
(1)], n = n∗ = K. To examine the integration of capital markets, then,
noting this and (25), I define the variable
β =
{
0 with immobile capital n = K,
1 with mobile capital n = n˜(w,w∗).
(26)
Given (24), (25) and (26), the number of domestic firms is the following
function of the wages (w,w∗) and the parameter β:
n(w,w∗, β) .= βn˜(w,w∗) + (1− β)K, dn
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
= 0,
∂n
∂β
= n˜−K,
∂2n
∂w∂β
=
∂n˜
∂w
< 0,
∂n
∂β
∣∣∣∣
n∗=n=K
= 0. (27)
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7. The political economy
I compare the case where the governments delegate their policy to the
common international regulator with the case where they act independently,
taking the wage in the other country as given. Because the countries are
identical, then, in both cases, the wages, the number of firms, national em-
ployment and the marginal utility of income are uniform in both countries
in equilibrium [cf. (7), (9), (13) and (23)]:
w∗ = w, n∗ = n = K, l∗ = l =
L
2
, H∗ = H, U1(2H, I, P ) = 1,
U1(H, I, P ) = U1(H
∗, I, P ) =
1
2
. (28)
I denote the equilibrium value with international regulation by subscript I
and that with national regulation by subscript N .
7.1. International regulation
In equilibrium (28), aggregate welfare (22) becomes [cf. (11), (12), (15)
and (21)]
VA(w) = U
(
2H(w,w,K), I(L(w,w,K)), P (L(w,w,K))
)
. (29)
The international regulator maximizes aggregate welfare (29) by setting the
uniform wage w∗ = w. This leads to the first-order and second-order condi-
tions [cf. (9), (11), (12), (15), (21) and (28)]
dVA
dw
= 2U1(2H, I, P )
dH
dw
+ U2(2H, I, P )
dI
dL
dL
dw
+ U3(2H, I, P )
dP
dL
dL
dw
= U1(2H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
[
2
dH
dw
+
U2(2H, I, P )
U1(2H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− 1
2
dI
dL
dL
dw
+
U3(2H, I, P )
U1(2H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− a
2b
dP
dL
dL
dw
]
= 2
dH
dw
− 1
2
dI
dL
dL
dw
− a
2b
dP
dL
dL
dw
= 2
dH
dw
− P − bL
2
dL
dw
+
a
2
dL
dw
= 2
dH
dw
+ (bL+ a− P︸ ︷︷ ︸
=bL
)
1
2
dL
dw
= 2
dH
dw
+ bL
dL
dw
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= 2
(
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂w∗
+
∂H
∂n
dn
dw︸︷︷︸
=0
)
+ bL
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂w∗
+
∂L
∂n
dn
dw︸︷︷︸
=0
)
= 2
(
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂w∗
)
+ bL
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂w∗
)
= 0,
d2VA
dw2
< 0. (30)
In the model, international labor market policy leads to Pareto optimum. Be-
cause the functions n, L(w,w∗, n), ∂L
∂w
(w,w∗, n), ∂L
∂w∗ (w,w
∗, n), ∂H
∂w
(w,w∗, n)
and ∂H
∂w∗ (w,w
∗, n) are independent of β at the symmetric equilibrium (28) [cf.
(15), (21) and (27)], then, the first-order condition dVA
dw
= 0 is independent
of it, too. Thus, one obtains the result:
Proposition 1. A switch from national to international regulation estab-
lishes Pareto optimum and enhances welfare. With international regulation,
capital transfer liberalization (i.e. a change of β) has no effect.
7.2. National regulation
Noting the price index (11), aggregate income (12), aggregate employment
(15) and the number of domestic firms, (27), one can define domestic welfare
(21) as a function of the wages and the parameter β:
VN(w,w
∗, β) .=
U
(
H
(
w,w∗, n(w,w∗)
)
, I
(
w,w∗, n(w,w∗)
)
, P
(
L
(
w,w∗, n(w,w∗)
)))
. (31)
The domestic government maximizes domestic welfare (31) by the domestic
wage w subject to given the foreign wage w∗. In equilibrium (28), the first-
order and second-order conditions of this are [cf. (9), (11) and (12)]
∂VN
∂w
= U1(H, I, P )
(
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂n
∂n
∂w
)
+
[
U2(H, I, P )
dI
dL
+ U3(H, I, P )
dP
dL
](
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
)
11
= U1(H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 1
2
{
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂n
∂n
∂w
+
[
U2(H, I, P )
U1(H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− 1
4
dI
dL
+
U3(H, I, P )
U1(H, I, P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=− 3a
4b
dP
dL
](
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
)}
=
1
2
{
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂n︸︷︷︸
=wh′ ∂l
∂n
∂n
∂w
−
[
1
4
dI
dL︸︷︷︸
=P−bL
∂L
∂w
+
3a
4b
dP
dL︸︷︷︸
=−b
](
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
)}
=
1
4
{
2
∂H
∂w
+ wh′
∂l
∂n
∂n
∂w
+ (a+ bL)
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
)}
= 0,
∂2VN
∂w2
< 0.
(32)
From conditions (14), (28) and (32) it follows that
∂2VN
∂w∂β
=
wh′
4︸︷︷︸
+
∂2l
∂w∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0,
∂w
∂β
(w∗, β) = − ∂
2VN
∂w∂β︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
/
∂2VN
∂w2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
< 0.
Because the foreign government responds ∂w
∗
∂β
(w, β) < 0, correspondingly,
the equilibrium wage w∗ = w decreases. Because the wage w∗ = w decreases
for all values β ∈ [0, 1], then, by the mean value theorem, the result can be
generalized for the discrete choice β ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
Proposition 2. With national regulation, capital transfer liberalization (i.e.
an increase of β from 0 to 1) decreases the wage w∗ = w.
The wage elasticity of employment in the domestic country is higher with
mobile β = 1 than with immobile capital β = 0 [cf. (14)],
∂2l
∂w∂β
< 0,
∂l
∂w
∣∣∣∣
β=0
<
∂l
∂w
∣∣∣∣
β=1
and − w
l
∂l
∂w
∣∣∣∣
β=0
> −w
l
∂l
∂w
∣∣∣∣
β=1
> 0. (33)
This aggravates the countries’ competition for jobs by wages.
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7.3. The centralization of labor market policy
To examine the effects of the centralization, I define a variable γ so that
γ = 0 with national and γ = 1 with international regulation. Noting this
and (28), I combine the first-order conditions in (30) and (32):
Γ(w,w∗, β, γ) .= γ
dVA
dw
(w) + 4(1− γ)∂VN
∂w
(w,w∗, β)
= (1− γ)
[
2
∂H
∂w
+ wh′
∂l
∂n
∂n
∂w
+ (a+ bL)
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
)]
+ γ
[
2
(
∂H
∂w
+
∂H
∂w∗
)
+ bL
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂w∗
)]
= 2
∂H
∂w
+ 2γ
∂H
∂w∗
+ (1− γ)wh′ ∂l
∂n
∂n
∂w
+ [(1− γ)a+ bL]∂L
∂w
+ γbL
∂L
∂w∗
+ (1− γ)(a+ bL)∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
= 0. (34)
In equilibrium (28), given (11), (14), (15), (20), (21) and (27), the function
(34) has the property
∂Γ
∂γ
= 2
∂H
∂w∗︸︷︷︸
+
−w h′︸︷︷︸
+
∂l
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
∂n
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
−a∂L
∂w
+ bL
∂L
∂w∗︸︷︷︸
= ∂L
∂w
−(a+ bL)∂L
∂n
∂n
∂w
> (bL− a︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−P
)
∂L
∂w
− (a+ bL) ∂L
∂n︸︷︷︸
=0
∂n
∂w
= −P ∂L
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
> 0. (35)
From the second-order conditions in (30) and (32) it follows that
∂Γ
∂w
(w, β, γ)
.
= γ
d2VA
dw2
+ 4(1− γ)∂
2VN
∂w2
.
Noting this and (35), and differentiating the first-order condition (34) totally,
one obtains ∂w
∂γ
(w∗, β, γ) = − ∂Γ
∂γ
/
∂Γ
∂w
> 0. Because the foreign government
responds ∂w
∗
∂γ
(w, β, γ) > 0, correspondingly, the equilibrium wage w∗ = w
increases. Because the wage w∗ = w increases for all values γ ∈ [0, 1], then,
by the mean value theorem, the result can be generalized for the discrete
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choice γ ∈ {0, 1} as follows:
Proposition 3. The delegation of labor market regulation to the interna-
tional policy maker (i.e. an increase of γ from 0 to 1) increases the wage
w∗ = w.
The elimination of inter-country competition over jobs by labor market dereg-
ulation encourages the governments to raise the wage in their countries.
7.4. Welfare comparisons
From Propositions 1 and 3 it follows that an increase in the wage w∗ = w
is welfare enhancing. Because an increase in the uniform wage w∗ = w leads
simultaneously to a lower capital owner’s welfare [cf. (18)], the workers’
welfare must increase. I summarize these results as follows:
Proposition 4. Starting from the initial point of national labor market pol-
icy, an increase in the wage w∗ = w increases aggregate welfare and the
worker’s welfare, but decreases the capital owner’s welfare.
Finally, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 have the following corollary:
Proposition 5. A switch from national to international regulation promotes
aggregate welfare and the worker’s welfare, but hampers the capital owner’s
welfare, while capital transfer liberalization does the opposite.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, I examine the capital market integration of two identical
countries where labor markets are regulated, either by binding minimum
wages or by controlling the relative bargaining power of labor unions. The
regulation is performed either by the local governments or by the common
regulator of the countries. To conduct the analysis, I start with Neary’s
(2016) general oligopolistic equilibrium model (GOLE) with a unit mass
of sectors, each containing a small number of firms. In line with Martin
and Rogers (1995) and Egger and Etzel (2014), I enrich this framework with
capital as a second factor of production. The main results are then as follows.
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Assuming exogenous labor union power (e.g. monopoly unions), Alois et
al. (2009) and Boulhol (2009) argue that capital transfer liberalization de-
creases union wages through changing the elasticity of labor demand. This
reduces distortions in the labor markets, decreasing the workers welfare but
promoting both aggregate and the capital owners’ welfare. In this article, I
assume that relative union bargaining power is endogenously determined by
the government’s regulations and the employed workers support the unem-
ployed through an unemployment insurance scheme. Then, the delegation
of labor market regulation to an international policy maker leads to Pareto
optimum. The national governments’ competition for jobs by labor market
deregulation causes a distortion with suboptimal wages. Because capital mar-
ket liberalization increases the wage elasticity of labor demand, it intensifies
the competition between the countries. This aggravates the distortion and
decreases wages and aggregate welfare ever further. Thus, the prediction is
the same in Alois et al. (2009) and Boulhol (2009) as in my model, but with
reverse interpretation: capital market liberalization decreases distortions in
the former, but increases those in the latter.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
model of international trade is used to explain the relationship of firms, la-
bor market organizations and national governments, the following judgement
nevertheless seems to be justified. So far, the common view has been that
the integration of capital markets should precede that of labor market insti-
tutions, because the former facilitates the exercise of the latter. This article
argues the opposite. Because premature relaxation of international capital
transfers can intensify the welfare loss due to the governments’ competition
over jobs, it might be appropriate first to integrate labor market institutions.
Appendix A. Utility functions (9)
Equations (8) yield bc(z) = a− p(z) and
bI =
∫ 1
0
p(z)bc(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
p(z)[a− p(z)]dz = aP −
∫ 1
0
p(z)2dz.
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This defines the uncentred variance of prices as follows:
σ
.
=
∫ 1
0
p(z)2di = aP − bI. (A.1)
On the other hand, transforming (5) into
bch(z) = a− λhp(z). (A.2)
and plugging (A.1) and (A.2) into (4), one obtains
bIh =
∫ 1
0
p(z)bch(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
[ap(z)− λhp(z)2]dz = aP − σλh.
Solving for the marginal utility of income yields
λh = (aP − bIh)/σ. (A.3)
From (6) and (7) it follows that λh <
∫ 1
0
λιdι = λ = 1. Plugging this, (A.1),
(A.2) and (A.3) into (3) yields (9):
buh
εh
=
∫ 1
0
[
abch(z)− b
2
ch(z)
2
]
d =
∫ 1
0
{
a[a− λhp(z)]− 1
2
[a− λhp(z)]2
}
di
=
∫ 1
0
{
a[a− λhp(z)]− 1
2
[
a2 − 2aλhp(z) + λ2hp(z)2
]}
dz
=
∫ 1
0
{
a2 − 1
2
[
a2 + λ2hp(z)
2
]}
dz =
a2
2
− λ
2
h
2
∫ 1
0
p(z)2dz
=
a2
2
− λ
2
h
2
σ =
a2
2
− (aP − bIh)
2
2σ
=
a2
2
− 1
2
(aP − bIh)2
aP − bI
.
= bU(Ih, I, P )
with λh = U1
.
=
∂U
∂Ih
∈ (0, 1), U2 .= ∂U
∂I
= −1
2
U21 < 0,
U3
.
=
∂U
∂P
= −a
b
(
∂U
∂Ih
+
∂U
∂I
)
=
a
b
U1
(
1
2
U1 − 1
)
< 0.
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Appendix B. Functions (14), (15), (16) and (17)
Because one unit of output is produced from one unit of labor, employ-
ment at home `(z) and abroad `∗(z) as well as the demand for good, c(z), in
sector z ∈ [0, 1] are given by
c(z) = `(z) + `∗(z), `(z) .=
n(z)∑
j=1
lj(z) and `
∗(z) .=
n∗(z)∑
j=1
l∗j (z). (B.1)
The profit of domestic firm j in sector z ∈ [0, 1] is
pij(z)
.
= [p(z)− w(z)]lj(z), (B.2)
where p(z) is the price and w(z) the wage in sector z. Home profits pi(z) in
sector z are the sum of the profits of the domestic firms, (B.2), in that sector:
pi(z) =
n∑
j=1
pij(z) = [p(z)− w(z)]`(z). (B.3)
Home firm j maximizes profit (B.2) by its input lj(z) subject to total
employment (B.1) and the inverse demand (8) for good z, given the wage
w(z) and the outputs of the other firms, `∗(z) and lξ(z) for ξ 6= j. The foreign
firms behave accordingly. This yields
∂pij(z)
∂lj(z)
= p(z)− w(z) + lj(z)∂p(z)
∂`(z)
∂`(z)
∂lj(z)
= p(z)− w(z)− blj(z)
= a− b[`(z) + `∗(z)]− blj(z)− w(z) = 0.
Because foreign firm in sector z ∈ [0, 1] does the same as well, this yields
lj(z) =
a− w(z)
b
− `(z)− `∗(z), l∗j (z) =
a− w∗(z)
b
− `(z)− `∗(z). (B.4)
Because all domestic and all foreign firms are identical, respectively, from
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(B.1) it follows that
`(z) = n(z)lj(z), `
∗(z) = n∗(z)l∗j (z). (B.5)
Noting this, the conditions (B.4) become
[n(z) + 1]lj(z) + n
∗(z)l∗j (z) = [a− w(z)]/b,
n(z)lj(z) + [n
∗(z) + 1]l∗j (z) = [a− w∗(z)]/b. (B.6)
Solving for lj(z) and l
∗
j (z) from (B.6) yields the firms’ labor inputs
lj(z) = [n(z) + n
∗(z) + 1]−1
{
a− [n∗(z) + 1]w(z) + n∗(z)w∗(z)}/b and
l∗j (z) = [n(z) + n
∗(z) + 1]−1
{
a− [n(z) + 1]w∗(z) + n(z)w(z)}/b.
From these equations, (B.1) and (B.5) it follows that
`(z) =
n(z)/b
n(z) + n∗(z) + 1
{
a− [n∗(z) + 1]w(z) + n∗(z)w∗(z)}, (B.7)
`∗(z) =
n∗(z)/b
n(z) + n∗(z) + 1
{
a− [n(z) + 1]w∗(z) + n(z)w(z)}, (B.8)
L =
∫ 1
0
c(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
[`(z) + `∗(z)]dz =
∫ 1
0
[`(z) + `∗(z)]dz
=
1
b
∫ 1
0
a[n(z) + n∗(z)]− n(z)w(z)− n∗(z)w∗(z)
n(z) + n∗(z) + 1
di. (B.9)
Because all sectors z ∈ [0, 1] are identical, then
`(z) = l, `∗(z) = l∗, w(z) = w, w∗(z) = w∗ and pi(z) = pi for z ∈ [0, 1].
(B.10)
Noting this, (11), (12), (13), (B.1), (B.3) and (B.7)-(B.9), one obtains do-
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mestic employment l and aggregate employment L = l + l∗ as functions of
the wages (w,w∗) and the number of domestic oligopolists, n:
l =
n
b
a− (n∗ + 1)w + n∗w∗
n+ n∗ + 1
=
n
b
a− [f(n) + 1]w + f(n)w∗
n+ f(n) + 1
.
= l(w,w∗, n),
∂l
∂w
(n) = −n
b
f(n) + 1
n+ f(n) + 1
< 0,
∂l
∂w∗
(n) =
n
b
f(n)
n+ f(n) + 1
> 0,
∂l
∂n
(w)
∣∣∣∣
w∗u=w, n∗=n
=
l
n
> 0,
dl
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w
= − n/b
n+ f(n) + 1
< 0; (B.11)
L = l + l∗ =
a(n+ n∗)− nw − n∗w∗
(n+ n∗ + 1)b
=
a[n+ f(n)]− nw − f(n)w∗
[n+ f(n) + 1]b
.
= L(w,w∗, n),
∂L
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
=
∂L
∂w∗
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
= − K/b
2K + 1
< 0,
∂L
∂n
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
=
(a− w)[1 + f ′(K)]
(2K + 1)b
− [1 + f
′(K)]L
2K + 1
= 0. (B.12)
Because the countries are identical, it holds true that
∂l∗
∂w∂n∗
=
∂l
∂w∗∂n
. (B.13)
Noting (13), (11), (B.3), (B.10), (B.11) and (B.12), one obtains domestic
profits pi as a function of (w,w∗, n):
pi(w,w∗, n) .= (P − w)l = (a− bL− w)l = [a− bL(w,w∗, n)− w]l(w,w∗, n),
∂pi
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w,n∗=n=K
=
(
−b∂L
∂w
− 1
)
l + (P − w︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
∂l
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
<
(
K
2K + 1
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)
l < 0,
dpi
dw
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
=
[
−b
(
∂L
∂w
+
∂L
∂w∗
+
∂L
∂n
dn
dw︸︷︷︸
=0
)
− 1
]
l + (P − w︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
dl
dw︸︷︷︸
−
<
(
2K
2K + 1
− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)
l < 0,
pi + pi∗ = (P − w)l + (P − w∗)l∗ = P (l + l∗)− wl − w∗l∗ = PL− wl − w∗l∗
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= [a− bL(w,w∗, n)]L(w,w∗, n)− wl(w,w∗, n)− w∗l∗(w,w∗, n∗),
∂(pi + pi∗)
∂n
= (a− 2bL)∂L˜
∂n
− w ∂l
∂n
− w∗ ∂l
∗
∂n∗
f ′(n),
∂2(pi + pi∗)
∂w∂n
∣∣∣∣
w∗=w, n∗=n=K
= (a− 2bL) ∂
2L
∂w∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−2b∂L
∂w
∂L
∂n︸︷︷︸
=0
− ∂l
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
−w ∂
2l
∂w∂n
− w∗︸︷︷︸
=w
∂2l∗
∂w∂n∗
f ′(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
< w
(
− ∂
2l
∂w∂n
+
∂2l∗
∂w∂n∗
)
= w
(
− ∂
2l
∂w∂n
+
∂2l
∂w∗∂n
)
= w
∂
∂n
(
− ∂l
∂w
+
∂l
∂w∗
)
= w
∂
∂n
[
n
b
f(n) + 1
n+ f(n) + 1
+
n
b
f(n)
n+ f(n) + 1
]
= w
∂
∂n
[
n
b
2f(n)− 1
n+ f(n) + 1
]
=
w
b
{
2f(n)− 1 + 2f ′(n)n
n+ f(n) + 1
− n[2f(n)− 1]
[n+ f(n) + 1]2
[1 + f ′(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
]
}
=
w
b
2f(n)− 1 + 2f ′(n)n
n+ f(n) + 1
=
w
b
2n− 1− 2n
n+ f(n) + 1
= −w
b
1
n+ f(n) + 1
< 0.
Appendix C. The representative domestic worker’s utility (20)
Let v be the employed’s and z the unemployed’s disposable income. Be-
cause the mass of domestic workers is unity, of which the proportion l is
employed and 1 − l unemployed, the budget constraint for the unemploy-
ment insurance scheme is
lv + (1− l)z = wl. (C.1)
According to (9), an employed worker’s utility is given by U(v, I, P ) and
an unemployed worker’s utility by (1 + g)U(z, I, P ). Because all income-
consumption curves are linear with quadratic preferences (3), (1+g) workers
earning z derive the same utility as one worker earning (1 + g)z:
(1 +g)U(z, I, P ) = U
(
(1 +g)z, I, P
)
. A worker has incentive to supply labor
as long as its utility as employed is at least as high as that as unemployed:
U(v, I, P ) ≥ (1 + g)U(z, I, P ) = U((1 + g)z, I, P).
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This is equivalent to
v ≥ (1 + g)z. (C.2)
Because all income-consumption curves are linear with quadratic prefer-
ences (3), the sum of all domestic workers’ utilities is
VW = lU(v, I, P ) + (1− l)(1 + g)U(z, I, P )
= lU(v, I, P ) + U
(
(1− l)(1 + g)z, I, P)
= U
(
lv + (1− l)(1 + g)z, I, P). (C.3)
The representative domestic worker maximizes (C.3) by the employed’s and
unemployed’s income, v and z, subject to its budget constraint (C.1) and in-
centive constraint (C.2), given the wage w, domestic employment l, aggregate
income I and the price level P :
(v, z) = arg max
(v, z) s.t. (C.1) and (C.2)
VW
= arg max
(v, z) s.t. (C.1) and (C.2)
[lv + (1− l)(1 + g)z] =
(
h(l)w,
h(l)w
1 + g
)
,
where h(l)
.
=
(1 + g)l
1 + gl
with h′ =
1 + g
(1 + gl)2
> 0.
Then, the representative domestic worker’s utility is
VW = arg max
(v, z) s.t. (C.1) and (C.2)
U
(
lv + (1− l)(1 + g)z, I, P) = U(h(l)w, I, P).
Appendix D. Collective bargaining
Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), Kreickemeier and Meland (2013), and
Egger and Etzel (2012, 2014) introduce a simple textbook model of rents-
maximizing monopoly unions into the general oligopolistic equilibrium model
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(GOLE) of Neary (206). I prefer to derive the utility functions of the labor
union and employer federation directly from the households’ preferences (3)
of the GOLE model. I consider firm-specific wage bargaining, where the
number of firms is held constant, for simplicity.
Let the workers and capital owners in a single domestic sector be or-
ganized in a labor union and an employer federation, respectively. These
attempt to maximize their member’s utility (20) and (18), respectively, by
the wage w subject to sectorial employment (14) and sectorial profit (16),
given the foreign wage w∗, aggregate income I, the price index P and the
number of domestic firms, n. When these parties alternate in making offers
to each other, they behave as if they jointly set the domestic wage w to
maximize a weighed geometric average of their targets called the Generalized
Nash Product2 as follows:3
w = arg max
w
[VW + (1/δ − 1)VΠ]
= arg max
w
[
U
(
h
(
l(w,w∗, n)
)
w, I, P
)
+ (1/δ − 1)U(pi(w,w∗, n), I, P)]
= arg max
w
[
U
(
h
(
l(w,w∗, n)
)
w, I, P
)
+ U
(
(1/δ − 1)pi(w,w∗, n), I, P)]
= arg max
w
U
(
h
(
l(w,w∗, n)
)
w + (1/δ − 1)pi(w,w∗, n), I, P)
= arg max
w
[
h
(
l(w,w∗, n)
)
w + (1/δ − 1)pi(w,w∗, n)] .= arg max
w
Ω(w,w∗, n, δ)
with
∂Ω
∂δ
= −pi
δ2
and
∂2Ω
∂δ∂w
= −1
δ2
∂pi
∂w︸︷︷︸
−
> 0, (D.1)
where the the weight δ ∈ (0, 1) is relative union bargaining power.
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), I assume that relative union
bargaining power δ ∈ (0, 1) depends on labor market regulations (e.g. restric-
tions in starting a dispute, the intermediation of disputes). The maximization
2Cf. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1986.
3Because all income-consumption curves are linear with quadratic preferences (3), then,
according to Neary (2016), (1/δ − 1) households earning pi derive the same utility as a
household earning (1/δ− 1)pi, and households earning hw and (1/δ− 1)pi derive the same
utility as a household earning hw + (1/δ − 1)pi.
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in (D.1) yields the first-order condition ∂Ω
∂w
= 0 and second-order condition
∂2Ω
∂w2
< 0. Differentiating ∂Ω
∂w
= 0 and noting ∂
2Ω
∂w2
< 0 and (D.1) yield that the
wage is an increasing function of relative union bargaining power δ:
w = w˜(w∗, n, δ),
∂w˜
∂δ
= − ∂
2Ω
∂w∂δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
/
∂2Ω
∂w2︸︷︷︸
−
> 0.
Because the regulator in the end determines union power, then, with some
complication, the result ∂w˜
∂δ
> 0 would be the same also also in the case of
country-wide wage bargaining where the domestic labor union and employer
federation take the effect of the domestic wage w on the price index (11),
aggregate employment (15) and capital transfers (27) into account.
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